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INTERPRETATIVE EQUALITY AS A
STRUCTURAL IMPERATIVE (OR "PUCKER
UP AND SETTLE THIS!")
Gary Lawson*
To serious students of the Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall's discussion of judicial review in Marbury v. Madisont was
about judicial equality-the power of the courts, co-equal to the
similar powers of the legislative and executive departments, to
construe and apply the Constitution in the course of their duties.
To less serious students of the Constitution, Marbury was about
judicial supremacy-the supposedly paramount power of courts
to interpret and apply the Constitution in a fashion that binds
other legal actors, including the legislative and executive departments and state officials.
Marbury's recent past, dating roughly from Cooper v.
Aaron2 in 1958 through the early 1990s, reflected the triumph of
a judicial supremacist revolution (or coup). Persons who
doubted judicial supremacy, such as Attorney General Edwin
Meese,3 were generally treated by the legal intelligentsia as
something akin to Raelians. Marbury's present, dating roughly
from the publication by the Federalist Society of a pamphlet on
the debate over interpretative authority in 1992' to the current
day, reflects the triumph of the "departmentalist" counterrevolutionaries (or freedom fighters), who maintain that the courts' interpretative powers are no greater than those of other legal actors. The counterrevolution has enjoyed considerable-and one
might even say remarkable-success; today, it is difficult to find

*
Professor, Boston University School of Law. I have no one to thank because I
have not asked anyone for comments. I know what they will say, and I don't want to hear
it.

1.
2.
3.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987).

4. THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CONSTITUTION? THE
DEBATE OVER INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY (1992).
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people who will defend5 judicial supremacy "with anything other
than hot air or bluster.",
I have no talent for prognostication, so I will not venture to
predict the future direction of this battle. In part, the direction of
the debate depends on the reasons for its past course. If, for instance, departmentalism has triumphed in recent years because
of the power of its arguments and the eloquence of its advocates,
one might expect the departmentalist reading of Marbury to enjoy a long and healthy life. A truly cynical soul, however, might
suggest that the legal intelligentsia's acquiescence to departmentalism in the past decade had more to do with the combination of
a Democratic President and a conservative-leaning Supreme
Court than with the intellectual force of the arguments for departmentalism-in which case Marbury's future is largely in the
hands of the electoral college.
In any event, I do not intend here to rehearse the traditional
constitutional arguments for departmentalism or the traditional
arguments for a departmentalist reading of Marbury. Those arguments have been made at length by many people, including
myself.6 Instead, I want to explore some reasons why a rational
person might design a constitution along departmentalist lines in other words, to suggest why the interpretatively correct reading of the Constitution, and the doctrinally correct reading of
Marbury, might also be a normatively sound institutional
scheme. I offer this in direct response to the argument advanced
by Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer that, even if the Constitution of 1787 is departmentalist as a matter of text, structure, and
history, modern political actors should nonetheless accept Supreme Court pronouncements on the Constitution as authoritative.7 Their case, in brief, is that the settlement function of law,
and especially of constitutional law, requires a supreme interpreter, and because the Supreme Court is the best available candidate for that role, legal actors should treat Supreme Court decisions as the final word on constitutional meaning. The
argument is explicitly normative and accordingly can only be answered by other normative arguments.

5. Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation,81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996).
6. For an accounting of the literature, see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer,
Defending JudicialSupremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 458 nn.12-13 (2000);
Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1269 n.4.
7. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On ExtrajudicialConstitutionalInterpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997); Alexander & Schauer, supra note 6.
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I am uncomfortable treading this normative ground for two
reasons. First, I am dubious about the value of normative legal
scholarship, even when it comes from such luminaries as Alexander, Schauer, or Lawson.8 Second, Alexander and Schauer's
particular normative argument for judicial supremacy rests, as it
must, on the conditions that make the Constitution of 1787 politically authoritative for contemporary actors, and I am not at
all persuaded that any such conditions exist. It is no small matter
to explain why the American Constitution of 1787 has any
greater normative status than does the Alexander-Schauer Constitution of 2000.' Thus, in order to engage Alexander and
Schauer on their own terms, I would have to make normative arguments that I do not think can be grounded in an academically
responsible fashion, based on assumptions about the normative
status of the Constitution that I do not accept. Accordingly, I
confine myself to a somewhat more limited point: the normative
case for a departmentalist constitution has elements that Alexander and Schauer did not adequately address and that persons
interested in normative questions about the Constitution may
find interesting. Further the deponent saith not.
Alexander and Schauer are right about many things. They
are right that law's settlement function is vitally important. They
are right that such a function is especially important in constitutional law, where the whole point of a constitution is to lock in
certain resolutions of contested questions. They are right that, in
general, such a function is better served by a clear hierarchy of
interpretative authority than by a system of coordinate interpreters. And let us even assume that they are right about something on which they are actually embarrassingly wrong: that the
Supreme Court is the best candidate for a supreme interpreter if
there must be one. 0 Grant all of this and the case against departmentalist interpretation still has not been made.

8. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 727, 778 (1988) ("It is conceivable that the ethical, epistemological, and metaphysical problems of the ages will be solved by an article in a twentieth-century, Englishlanguage law journal. But I rather doubt it."). I am not substantially more optimistic
about the likely contributions to moral knowledge from twenty-first century law journals.
9. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 6, at 465.
10. The best candidate for supreme interpreter is, obviously, me. The second best
candidate is probably Mike Paulsen, though I suppose that reasonable people could disagree on the proper sequence once we get past me on the list. In any event, there are going to be quite a few people who are well ahead of the Supreme Court. Of course, I am
not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution as a potential authoritative interpreter, but
it is unclear why that is relevant to a preconstitutional argument.
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Consider the more general case for a regime that divides
governmental power through separation of powers and bicameralism. Separation of powers, as its critics are quick to point
out, is very messy." The American system of separation of powers and bicameralism, which provides for the possibility, and
even likelihood, of divided government, is especially messy. The
lawmaking process is slow, cumbersome, and difficult. The laws
that emerge from such a divided regime are likely to lack coherence, and thus likely to lack some of the characteristics that
make law valuable. The separation of execution from lawmaking
increases the cumbersomeness, unpredictability, and incoherence of the system: the actual effect of laws will vary enormously
across space and time with variations in enforcement regimes.
Throw in a separate judicial body and the problems of predictability and coherence multiply. Separation of powers and bicameralism significantly threaten the settlement function of law. The
same arguments can be made about federalism. The dispersion
of authority among distinct governmental actors creates the possibility of conflicts among jurisdictions and reduces the clarity of
signals sent by any one jurisdiction to its subjects. Federalism
significantly threatens the settlement function of law.
Separation of powers, bicameralism, and federalism are all
mechanisms for dispersing power that make it more difficult for
wise lawmakers to produce and enforce a stable, coherent body
of law and make it more difficult for subjects to conform to the
commands of their masters. If one was confident that the governmental masters were likely to be wise and benevolent rulers
who would do the right thing a substantial percentage of the
time, it is hard to imagine why one would ever adopt a regime
containing these structural features. That may be why many
countries have not in fact adopted such a regime and why modern America has effectively abandoned it through adoption of
administrative mechanisms that mostly dispense with the structural niceties of the Constitution. t2
But there is nonetheless a powerful normative case for an
eighteenth-century-American style system of separated powers,
11. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV.
633 (2000).
12- See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1231 (1994). Modern administrative government emerged from an express rejection
of eighteenth-century principles of federalism and separated powers. See JAMES LANDIS,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) (heaping contempt upon strategies for dividing
governmental power).
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bicameralism, and federalism.' 3 Quite simply, separation of powers works better than more concentrated systems, whether parliamentary or dictatorial, if governments are likely to reach a lot
of wrong results-whether through corruption, stupidity, disinterest, or lack of knowledge. 14 Put bluntly, separation of powers
reduces the amount of damage that any particular bad people
can do. A really bad American President (and we have had
plenty) can do a lot of damage-but less than he could if he also
had all legislative and judicial powers. A really bad Senator (and
we have had plenty) can do a lot of damage, but less than if all
power was concentrated in the hands of the Senator or his/her
cronies. A really bad state (and we have had plenty) can do a lot
of damage, but less than if its decisions were uniformly imposed
on a larger region. Separation of powers, federalism, and bicameralism are destabilizing, or un-settling, to the point that they seriously threaten some of the core reasons for having law in the
first place. Maybe they are in fact a bad idea. But maybe they
aren't. It doesn't take very much risk aversion to think that dividing power is, all things considered, likely to work better
across a broad range of real-world scenarios than concentrating
it in one authority.
Interpretative power is a kind of governmental power-a
very potent and important kind of governmental power. Concentrating it in one place furthers some important values that go to
the very core of law. But it is a very risky strategy. If the supreme interpreter is in fact likely to be bad at the job, then one
must face the costs of imposing bad decisions on a whole country. The same arguments that justify dividing the power of substantive lawmaking among different bodies also justify dividing
the power of interpretation among different bodies. It does not
take very much risk aversion to justify departmentalism.
Nor does it take much empiricism. The Supreme Court does
a generally miserable job of interpreting the Constitution,
judged by pretty much any plausible standard that one could advance. That is not to say that presidents, members of Congress,
13. Steve Calabresi has eloquently (at least for a non-libertarian) defended some
aspects of American-style separation of powers, see Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of
PresidentialGovernment: Why ProfessorAckerman Is Wrong to Prefer the German to the

U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51 (2001); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative
Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995), and federalism, see Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995).
14. See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE

RULE OF LAW (1998) (discussing the problems of knowledge, interest, and power).
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or state officials are any better; we are assuming, remember, that
the Supreme Court is the best choice among the available candidates for the role of supreme interpreter. That is exactly the
point. The best choice is still a really bad one. Any choice of supreme interpreter (other than me) poses extraordinary risks of
great harm; just ask any partially-born baby whose brain is about
to get sucked out. 5 Rather than choose a supreme interpreter,
why not cut your losses by dividing interpretative authority
across many actors? The price of liberty is eternal vigilanceand it just might also cost some settlement in the bargain. Even
if settlement is the sine qua non of law, the bargain might still be
a good one. After all, law is the handmaiden of liberty, not vice
versa.
In sum, the case for dividing interpretative authority is no
different than the case for dividing legislative authority horizontally or vertically, for separating legislative from executive authority, or for dividing power geographically among distinct
units. Alexander and Schauer either need to distinguish interpretation from other legal activities or acknowledge that they are
making a substantially stronger claim about constitutional design
than they are letting on.
A focus on the separation-of-powers rationale for departmentalism has important consequences for departmentalists as
well. First, it means that one needs to think carefully about the
role of state officials in the constitutional scheme. Alexander and
Schauer note that many departmentalists balk (as I do not) at
giving state officials interpretative authority on a par with Supreme Court Justices.16 As a textual, structural, and historical
matter, state officials have the same power of interpretation as
federal officials; if departmentalists don't talk about the states, it
is probably for no better reason than that they do not want to be
associated with a guy named Faubus any more than Alexander
and Schauer want to be associated with a guy named Taney. On
a pure normative level, it is true that increasing the number of
interpreters increases the costs of divided authority. It may well
be that there is an optimal level of dispersion of interpretative
authority that is less than the full dispersion that would result
from the constitutional scheme recognized by Marbury. But for
Alexander and Schauer, that would be, as it were, haggling over
the price as long as the optimal degree of dispersion is not zero.
15.
16.

If your stomach can handle it, see Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
Alexander & Schauer, supra note 6, at 475-76.
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Linking departmentalism to the more general risk-averting
case for structural constitutionalism also requires some serious
thought about precedent. A strong form of precedent concentrates power in temporally situated actors. A regime of weak or
no precedent better disperses power, albeit at a cost in terms of
settlement. A person who is worried about governmental power
may well be suspicious of precedent. A person who is really,
really worried about governmental power and its tendency to
corrupt might even question whether there ought to be vertical
precedent-that is, whether district judges should have to follow
the Supreme Court's edicts. t7 Again, as a normative matter,
there is likely to be an optimal level of dispersion of interpretative authority within a judicial system. Again, that level may be
somewhere between zero and complete dispersion; it seems
unlikely to be zero.' 8
Finally, as Alexander and Schauer perceptively suggest, 9
concerns about dispersion of power may raise doubts about the
value of constitutionalism itself. What is constitutionalism, after
all, if not the concentration of power in a specific group of temporally-situated actors? Does that enterprise not pose the risk
that really bad decisions could be locked in across a whole country (and across a whole temporal universe of future countries)?
If we worry about concentrating interpretative authority in a Supreme Court, shouldn't we also worry about concentrating substantive authority in the Constitution?
Of course we should. There can be no plausible normative
case for constitutionalism in the abstract. A constitutional regime might be better than the available alternatives, but that depends on, inter alia, the particulars of the constitution, the structures that surround and support it, and the range of available
alternatives. That is why there can never be a normative case for
the authority of the American Constitution that does not pay serious attention to the substance of what that Constitution prescribes. My narrow point in this essay is only that if there are any
normative reasons for adhering to the most obvious structural
features of the American Constitution, those reasons can also
17. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Theme of
Robert M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33,77-88 (1989).
18. This is not a statement about the actual regime of precedent prescribed by the
Constitution. I have ruminated about that elsewhere, Gary Lawson, The Constitutional
Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994), and hope to ruminate
more carefully in the future.
19. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 6, at 457-58.
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justify the departmentalist interpretative method that is an integral part of that structure. And if the Constitution's most obvious structural features are normatively undesirable, it is very
hard to see why we do not simply remove the word "Constitution" from the legal vocabulary and start over.

